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This paper is a response to Nenad Miščević’s “Reply to Michael Devitt”, 
the latest in an exchange on the source of linguistic intuitions. Miščević 
defends a modifi ed version (“MoVoC”) of the received view that these 
intuitions are the product of a linguistic competence. I have earlier re-
jected all versions of the received view urging instead that intuitions 
are, like perceptual judgments, empirical theory-laden central-processor 
responses to phenomena. (1) I emphasize here, against Miščević, that this 
claim about a speaker’s intuitions about strings is not to be confl ated with 
a claim about her understanding of strings. (2) I develop my claim, ad-
dressed by Miščević, that MoVoC is implausible in three ways. But these 
are not the main problems for MoVoC. For further discussion of those, 
see Jutronić’s paper in this volume.
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Nenad Miščević (2006, 2009, 2012, 2014a, b), Dunja Jutronić (2012, 
2014), and I (2006c, 2014) have been in an exchange about linguistic in-
tuitions for more than a decade. I have found this very productive but I 
suspect that we have now reached the point of diminishing return. So I 
shall be brief.
1. VoC (“The Voice of Competence”)
I claim that VoC is the received view of intuitions in linguistics. Con-
sider the intuitive judgments that
(1) John seems to Bill to want to help himself
is a grammatical/acceptable sentence, and that in it ‘himself’ co-refers 
with ‘John’. VoC is the view that these intuitions are the product of a 
linguistic competence residing in a sub-central module of the mind. I 
describe VoC as the view that linguistic competence, all on its own,
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provides information about the linguistic facts… So these judgments are 
not arrived at by the sort of empirical investigation that judgments about 
the world usually require. Rather, a speaker has a privileged access to facts 
about the language, facts captured by the intuitions, simply in virtue of be-
ing competent… (2006a: 96; 2006b: 483–4).
On this view, competence not only plays the dominant role in linguis-
tic usage, it also provides informational content to metalinguistic intu-
itions. Those intuitions are indeed, “noise” aside, the voice of compe-
tence. That is why they are reliable.
Miščević holds to a “modifi ed” version of VoC, “MoVoC”. I reject all 
versions of VoC partly because I think I have a better view, “The Mod-
est Explanation”, which unfortunately has been labeled “ordinarism”.
2. The Modest Explanation or “Ordinarism”
The Modest Explanation of linguistic intuitions arises from a view of 
intuitive judgments in general. I argue that intuitions are empirical 
central-processor responses to phenomena, differing from many other 
such responses only in being fairly immediate and unrefl ective, based 
on little if any conscious reasoning. These judgments are theory-laden 
in the way observation judgments are in general. Related to this “we 
should trust a person’s intuitions…to the degree that we have confi dence 
in her empirically based expertise about the kinds under investigation” 
(2006a: 104; 2006b: 492). Sometimes the folk are as trustworthy as any-
one in an area but where there are experts, particularly scientists, the 
folk are not. So we should prefer the paleontologist’s intuitions about 
old bones, the physicist’s, about certain physical facts, the psychologist’s, 
about certain cognitive phenomena, the art expert, about a sixth-century 
Greek marble statue, and Vic Braden about tennis serves (2006a: 104–5; 
2006: 492–3). And when it comes to linguistics, “the intuitions that lin-
guistics should mostly rely on are those of the linguists themselves be-
cause the linguists are the most expert” (2006a: 111; 2006b: 499).
Just as the paleontologist, the art expert, and Vic Braden, imme-
diately recognize the relevant property in their cases, so too does the 
speaker in easy linguistic cases. Consider the strings, ‘responded the 
quickly speaker’ and ‘the speaker responded quickly’. I have pointed 
out that “the speaker is likely to recognize immediately, without re-
fl ecting…, that the former word salad is unacceptable and the latter 
simple sentence is acceptable” (2010a: 255). In my paper, “Linguistic 
Intuitions: In Defense of ‘Ordinarism’” (2014), I emphasize that these 
“linguistic intuitions are perceptual judgments…as immediate as those 
of the art expert and Braden, without the conscious and deliberate ex-
ercise of her competence” (2014: 14).
In his “Reply to Michael Devitt”, Miščević says he agrees “complete-
ly” with this claim (2014a: 25).1 But he continues on as if my claim is 
1 Hereinafter, all citations of Miščević and me are of these 2014 papers unless 
specifi ed otherwise.
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about a speaker’s understanding of strings: that understanding is what 
he takes to be like percepts. Yet my actual claim is not this quite un-
controversial one but rather that intuitions about strings are like per-
cepts. The confl ation of this crucial distinction between understanding 
a string and having an intuition about it runs right through Miščević’s 
discussion. This is a common confl ation among defenders of VoC, as I 
have pointed out (2010b: 839). That is my fi rst point in this response 
to Miščević.
Let me give just one other example of the confl ation. In response to 
my claim,
To say that a speaker may perceive that a string has a certain syntactic 
property without a conscious and deliberate exercise of her competence…
is not to say that her competence is not involved in her perception (p. 14),
Miščević responds: “if the competence is involved, as the just quoted 
passage suggests, why is VoC on the wrong track?” (p. 26). And the 
answer is: because the competence is involved in understanding the 
string not in providing the informative content of the intuition, as VoC 
requires.
3. Criticism of VoC (MoVoC)
So why should we prefer ordinarism to VoC? I quoted (p. 11) the follow-
ing summary of my reasons:
The main problems with it are, fi rst, that, to my knowledge, it has never been 
stated in the sort of detail that could make it a real theory of the source of 
intuitions. Just how do the allegedly embodied principles yield the intu-
itions? We need more than a hand wave in answer. Second, again to my 
knowle dge, no argument has ever been given for VoC until Georges Rey’s 
recent attempt (2013) which, I argue (2013), fails. Third, given what else 
we know about the mind, it is unlikely that VoC could be developed into a 
theory that we would have good reason to believe (2015: 37).
I went on to look critically at Miščević’s MoVoC in light of these problems 
(pp. 11–12). So too did Jutronić (2014). Miščević has responded to her 
(2014b). I leave it to her to pursue the matter (this volume).
Apart from these three main problems, I also summarized three other 
implausibilities of VoC (p. 12). Miščević addresses these in his reply to 
me and so I shall develop them in more detail here.
(i) There are clearly lots of linguistic facts about which ordinary 
speakers have few if any intuitions: facts about heads, c-command, 
and so on. Why is that? “If our competence…speaks to us at all, 
how come it says so little?” (2006a: 101; 2006b: 489). We wonder 
what account of the causal route from embodied rules (and prin-
ciples) to intuitions could account for this. In his reply, Miščević 
emphasizes how many intuitions about grammaticality and 
binding hearers have (p. 23). They do indeed have many tokens 
of these types of intuitions. But my point was about types not 
tokens: How come competence does not deliver intuitions about 
280 M. Devitt, Intuitions: Rijeka Response to Nenad Miščević
many other types of grammatical facts, like about c-command 
facts?
(ii) Chomsky has, in effect, found support for VoC in an analogy 
with the intuitions yielded by the visual system (1965, pp. 8–9; 
2000, p. 125). Others have followed him in this (Rey 2006, pp. 
563–8; Collins 2007, p. 421; Fitzgerald 2010: 134–42). I have re-
jected the analogy (2006a: 112–3; 2006b: 500–1; 2010b: 850–2). 
Indeed, I argue that there would be a disanalogy between the 
intuitions provided by the language faculty and by perceptual 
modules which undermines VoC. Miščević doesn’t “get it. Why 
would the MoVoC proposal be committed to any such disanal-
ogy?” (p. 23) Here is the answer that I cited:
According to the standard explanation, the language module delivers syntac-
tic and semantic information about expressions to the central processor. If it 
did this it would be disanalogous to perceptual modules…. For, if [the lan-
guage module delivers syntactic and semantic information about expressions 
to the central processor], the central processor would have direct access to 
information that the language module allegedly uses to fulfi ll its task of pro-
cessing language. But nobody supposes that the central processor has direct 
access to analogous information used by perceptual modules to fulfi ll their 
processing tasks (2006a: 114; 2006b: 503).
(iii) 
Developmental evidence suggests that the ability to speak a language and 
the ability to have intuitions about the language are quite distinct, the for-
mer being acquired in early childhood, the latter, in middle childhood as 
part of a general cognitive development. (2015: 37)
Miščević doubts that these developmental stages are really distinct, 
citing a “proposal that ties the acquisition of full competence to a later 
stage” (p. 24). This proposal talks of
language users who might be described as ‘not fully competent’, such as 
very young children, second language learners, or aphasics who have lost 
access to part of their language competence. Such language users may re-
sort to simplifi ed strategies or heuristics for sentence processing (Ingram 
2007: 18).
The evidence I cite (2010b: 853 n. 27) distinguishes two stages of cogni-
tive development, early childhood up to around 3, and middle childhood 
from around 4 to 8. It is alleged that syntactic competence is achieved 
in the early stage, metalinguistic intuitions, in the middle one. This 
could be quite consistent with what Ingram claims; in particular, “very 
young children” may be ones who have not completed early childhood.
I emphasize that implausibilities (i) to (iii) are not the main prob-
lems for VoC and MoVoc. For further discussion of those main prob-
lems I direct the reader to Jutronić’s paper in this volume.
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